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Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation
Games
Nuh Aygu¨n Dalkıran and Serdar Yu¨ksel
Abstract
Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic
long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The
key assumption in our model is that the information of the short-lived players is nested in that of
the long-lived player. This nested information structure is obtained through an appropriate monitoring
structure. Under this monitoring structure, we show that, given mild assumptions, the set of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium payoffs coincide with Markov Perfect Equilibrium payoffs, and hence a dynamic
programming formulation can be obtained for the computation of equilibrium strategies of the strategic
long-lived player in the discounted setup. We also consider the undiscounted setup where we obtain
an optimal equilibrium strategy of the strategic long-lived player. We then use this optimal strategy in
the undiscounted setup as a tool to obtain an upper payoff bound for the arbitrarily patient long-lived
player in the discounted setup. Finally, by using measure concentration techniques, we obtain a refined
lower payoff bound on the value of reputation in the discounted setup. We also establish the continuity
of equilibrium payoffs in the prior beliefs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reputation plays an important role in long-run relationships. When one considers buying a
product from a particular firm, his action (buy / not buy) depends on his belief about this firm,
i.e., the firm’s reputation, which he has formed based on previous experiences (of himself and
of others). Many interactions among rational agents are repeated and are in the form of long-run
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2relationships. This is why, game theorists have been extensively studying the role of reputation
in long-run relationships and repeated games [35]. By defining reputation as a conceptual as well
as a mathematical quantitative variable, game theorists have been able to explain how reputation
can rationalize intuitive equilibria, as in the expectation of cooperation in early rounds of a
finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma [29], and entry deterrence in the early rounds of the chain
store game [30], [36].
Recently, there has been an emergence of use of tools from information and control theory
in the reputations literature (see e.g., [23], [14], [15]). Such tools have been proved to be useful
in studying the bounds on the value of reputation.
In this paper, by adopting and generalizing recent results from stochastic control theory, we
provide a new approach and establish refined results on reputation games. Before stating our
contributions and the problem setup more explicitly, we provide a brief overview of the related
literature in the following subsection.
A. Related Literature
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson [29], [30], [36] introduced the adverse selection approach
to study reputations in finitely repeated games. Fudenberg and Levine [18], [19] extended this
approach to infinitely repeated games and showed that a patient long-lived player facing infinitely
many short-lived players can guarantee himself a payoff close to his Stackelberg payoff when
there is a slight probability that the long-lived player is a commitment type who always plays
the stage game Stackelberg action. When compared to the folk theorem [22], [21], their results
imply an intuitive expectation: the equilibria with relatively high payoffs are more likely to arise
due to reputation effects. Even though the results of Fudenberg and Levine [18], [19] hold for
both perfect and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [9] showed that
reputation effects are not sustainable in the long-run when there is imperfect public monitoring.
In other words, under imperfect public monitoring it is impossible to maintain a permanent
reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the complete information
game. There has been further literature which studies the possibility / impossibility of maintaining
permanent reputations, we refer the reader to [13], [14], [2], [3], [4], [37], [32], [16], [26], [15].
Sorin [40] unified and improved some of the results in reputations literature by using tools
from Bayesian learning and merging due to Kalai and Lehrer [27], [28]. Gossner [23] utilized
relative entropy (that is, information divergence or Kullback-Leibler divergence) to obtain bounds
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3on the value of reputations; these bounds coincide in the limit (as the strategic long-lived player
becomes arbitrarily patient) with the bounds provided by Fudenberg and Levine [18], [19].
Recently, there have been a number of related results in the information theory and control
literature on real-time signaling which provide powerful structural, topological, and operational
results that are in principle similar to the reputations models analyzed in game theory literature,
despite the simplifications that come about due to the fact that in these fields, the players
typically have a common utility function. Furthermore, such studies typically assume finitely
repeated setups, whereas we also consider here infinitely repeated setups, which require non-
trivial generalizations (see e.g., [43], [42], [41], [34], [45], [44], [31], [8] for various contexts
but note that all of these studies except [8], [44], [31] have focused on finite horizon problems).
Using such tools from stochastic control theory and zero-delay source coding, we provide new
techniques to study reputations. These techniques not only result in a number of conclusions
re-affirming certain results documented in the reputations literature, but also provide new results
and interpretations as we briefly discuss in the following.
Contributions of the paper. Our findings contribute to the reputations literature by obtain-
ing structural and computational results on the equilibrium behavior in finite-horizon, infinite-
horizon, and undiscounted settings in sequential reputation games, as well as refined upper and
lower bounds on the value of reputations: We analyze reputation games where a strategic long-
lived player acts in a repeated sequential-move game against a collection of short-lived players
each of whom plays the stage game only once but observes signals correlated with interactions
of the previous short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the information
of the short-lived players is nested in that of the long-lived player in a causal fashion. This
nested information structure is obtained through an appropriate monitoring structure. Under this
monitoring structure, we obtain stronger results than what currently exists in the literature in
a number of directions: (i) Given mild assumptions, we show that the set of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium payoffs coincide with Markov Perfect Equilibrium payoffs. (ii) A dynamic pro-
gramming formulation is obtained for the computation of equilibrium strategies of the strategic
long-lived player in the discounted setup. (iii) In the undiscounted setup, under an identifiability
assumption, we obtain an optimal strategy for the strategic long-lived player. In particular, we
provide new techniques to investigate the optimality of mimicking a Stackelberg commitment
type in the undiscounted setup. (iv) The optimal strategy we obtain in the undiscounted setup
also lets us obtain, through an Abelian inequality, an upper payoff bound for the arbitrarily
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4patient long-lived player –in the discounted setup. We show that this achievable upper bound is
identified with a stage game Stackelberg equilibrium payoff. (v) By using measure concentration
techniques, we obtain a refined lower payoff bound on the value of reputation for a fixed discount
factor. This lower bound coincides with the lower bounds identified by Fudenberg and Levine
[19] and Gossner [23] as the long-lived player becomes arbitrarily patient, i.e., as the discount
factor tends to 1. (vi) Finally, we establish the continuity of the equilibrium payoffs in the priors.
In the next section, we present preliminaries of our model as well as two motivating exam-
ples. Section III provides our structural results leading to the equivalence of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium payoffs and Markov Perfect Equilibrium payoffs in the discounted setup. Section IV
provides results characterizing the optimal behavior of the long-lived player for the undiscounted
setup, which lead us to an upper bound for the equilibrium payoffs in the discounted setup when
the long-lived player becomes arbitrarily patient. Section V provides, through an explicit measure
concentration analysis, a refined lower bound for the equilibrium payoffs of the strategic long-
lived player in the discounted setup. Section VI provides the continuity of the equilibrium payoffs
in the priors.
II. THE MODEL
A long-lived player (Player 1) plays a repeated stage game with a sequence of different short-
lived players (each of whom is referred as Player 2). Action sets of Player 1 and Player 2 in
the stage game are assumed to be finite and denoted by A1 and A2, respectively.
There is incomplete information regarding the type of the long-lived Player 1. The set of all
possible types of Player 1 is given by Ω = {ωn} ∪ Ωˆ where ωn is the strategic type (often
referred as normal type as well) and Ωˆ is a finite set of commitment types. Each type ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ
is a simple type committed to playing the corresponding (possibly mixed) action ωˆ ∈ ∆(A1) at
every stage of the interaction independent of the history of the play.1 The common knowledge
initial prior over Player 1’s types, µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω), is assumed to have full support.
The stage game is a sequential-move game: Player 1 moves first; when action a1 is chosen
by Player 1 in the stage game; a public signal z2 ∈ Z2 is observed by Player 2 which is drawn
according to the probability distribution ρ2(.|a1) ∈ ∆(Z2). Player 2, observing this public signal
(and all preceding ones), moves second. At the end of the stage game, Player 1 observes a
1∆(Ai) denotes the set of all probability measures on Ai for both i = 1, 2.
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5private signal z1 ∈ Z1 which depends on actions of both players and is drawn according to the
probability distribution ρ1(.|(a1, a2)). Both the set of Player 1’s all possible private signals, Z1,
and the set of (Player 2s’) all possible public signals, Z2, are assumed to be finite.
There is a nested information structure in the repeated game in the following sense: The
signals observed by Player 2s are public, and hence available to all subsequent players, whereas
Player 1’s signals are his private information. Therefore, the information of Player 2 at time
t− 1 is a subset of the information of Player 1 at time t.
Formally, a generic history for Player 2 at time t − 1 and a generic history for Player 1 at
time t are given as follows:
h2t−1 = (z
2
0 , z
2
1 , · · · , z
2
t−1) ∈ H
2
t−1 (1)
h1t = (a
1
0, z
1
0 , z
2
0 , · · · , a
1
t−1, z
1
t−1, z
2
t−1) ∈ H
1
t (2)
where H2t−1 := (Z
2)
t
and H1t := (A
1 × Z1 × Z2)
t
.
That is, each Player 2 observes, before he acts, a finite sequence of public signals which are
correlated with Player 1’s action in each of his interaction with preceding Player 2s. On the other
hand, Player 1 observes not only these public signals, but also a sequence of private signals for
each particular interaction that happened in the past, and obviously his actions in the previous
periods – but not necessarily the actions of preceding Player 2s.2
Due to its importance for our results, we explicitly note this nested information structure as
Remark II.1.
Remark II.1 (Nested Information). The signals observed by Player 2s are public and hence
available to all subsequent players whereas Player 1’s signals are his private information.
We note also that having such a monitoring structure is not a strong assumption. In particular,
it is weaker than the information structure in Fudenberg and Levine [19] where it is assumed
that only the same sequence of public signals are observable by the long-lived and short-lived
players, i.e., there is only public monitoring. Yet, it is stronger than the information structure in
Gossner [23] which allows private monitoring for both the long-lived and short lived players.
The stage game payoff function of the strategic (or normal) type long-lived Player 1 is given
by u1, and each short-lived Player 2’s payoff function is given by u2, where ui : A1×A2 → R.
2Note that Player 1 gets to observe the realizations of his earlier mixed actions.
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6The set of all possible histories for Player 2 of stage t is H2t = H
2
t−1×Z
2 where H2t−1 = (Z
2)
t
.
On the other hand, the set of all possible histories observable by the long-lived Player 1 prior to
stage t is H1t = (A
1 × Z1 × Z2)
t
. It is assumed that H10 := ∅ and H
2
0 := ∅, which is the usual
convention. Let H1 =
⋃
t≥0H
1
t be the set of all possible histories of the long-lived Player 1.
A (behavioral) strategy for Player 1 is a map:
σ1 : Ω×H1 → ∆(A1).
that satisfies σ1(ωˆ, h1t−1) = ωˆ for any ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ and for every h
1
t−1 ∈ H
1
t−1, since commitment
types are required to play the corresponding (fixed) action of the stage game independent of the
history. The set of all strategies for Player 1 is denoted by Σ1.
A strategy for Player 2 of stage t is a map:
σ2t : H
2
t−1 × Z
2 → ∆(A2).
We let Σ2t be the set of all such strategies and let Σ
2 = Πt≥0Σ
2
t denote the set of all sequences
of all such strategies. A history (or path) ht of length t is an element of Ω×(A
1×A2×Z1×Z2)t
describing Player 1’s type, actions, and signals realized up to stage t. By standard arguments
(e.g., Ionescu-Tulcea Theorem [24]), a strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1×Σ2 induces a unique
probability distribution Pσ over the set of all paths of play H
∞ = Ω × (A1 × A2 × Z1 × Z2)N
endowed with the product σ-algebra.
We let at = (a
1
t , a
2
t ) represent the action profile realized at stage t and let zt = (z
1
t , z
2
t ) denote
the signal profile realized at stage t. Given ω ∈ Ω, Pω,σ(.) = Pσ(.|ω) represents the probability
distribution over all paths of play conditional on Player 1 being type ω. Player 1’s discount factor
is assumed to be δ ∈ (0, 1) and hence, the expected discounted average payoff to the strategic
(normal type) long-lived Player 1 is given by π1(σ) = EPωn,σ(1− δ)
∑
t≥0 δ
tu1(at).
In most of our results, we will assume that Player 2s are Bayesian rational.3 Hence, we will
restrict attention to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: In any such equilibrium, the strategic Player
1 maximizes his expected discounted average payoff given that the short-lived players play a
best response to their expectations according to their updated beliefs.4 Each Player 2, playing
3A Bayesian rational Player 2 tries to maximize his expected payoff after updating his beliefs according to the Bayes’ rule
whenever possible. Some of our structural results on equilibrium behavior does not require Bayesian rationality and holds for
non-Bayesian Player 2s who might underreact or overreact to new (or recent) information as in [12] as well.
4This will be appropriately modified when we consider the undiscounted setup.
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7the stage game only once, will be best-responding to his expectation according to his beliefs
which are updated according to the Bayes’ Rule.
A strategy of Player 2s, σ2, is a best response to σ1 if, for all t,
EPσ [u
2(a1t , a
2
t )|z
2
[0,t]] ≥ EPσ [u
2(a1t , a
2)|z2[0,t]] for all a
2 ∈ A2 (Pσ − a.s.)
where z2[0,t] = (z
2
0 , z
2
1 , · · · , z
2
t ) denotes the information available to Player 2 at time t.
Next, we provide two examples to motivate our model.
A. Motivating Example I: The Product Choice Game
Our first example is a simple product choice game which describes how a strategic player can
build up reputation: There is a (long-lived) firm (Player 1) who faces an infinite sequence of
different consumers (Player 2s) with identical preferences. There are two actions available to the
firm: A1 = {H,L}, where H and L denote exerting high-effort and low-effort in the production
of its output, respectively. Each consumer also has two possible actions: buying a high-priced
product, (h), or a low-priced product, (l), i.e., A2 = {h, l}.
Each consumer prefers a high-priced product if the firm exerted high effort and a low-priced
product if the firm exerted low effort. The firm is willing to commit to high effort only if the
consumers purchase the high-priced product, i.e., the firm’s (pure) Stackelberg action –in the
stage game– is exerting high level of effort. Therefore, if the level of effort of the firm were
observable, each consumer would best reply to the Stackelberg action by buying a high priced
product. However, the choice of effort level of the firm is not observable before consumers choose
the product. Furthermore, exerting high effort is costly, and hence, for each type of product, the
firm prefers to exert low effort rather than high effort. That is, there is a moral hazard problem.
The corresponding stage game and the preferences regarding the stage game can be illustrated
as follows:
November 15, 2017 DRAFT
8P2P1
H
L
(2, 3)
(0, 2)
(3, 0)
(1, 1)
h
l
h
l
Figure 1: The illustration of the stage game
h l
H 2, 3 0, 2
L 3, 0 1, 1
Note that since the stage game is a sequential-move game where actions are not observable,
it is strategically equivalent to a simultaneous-move game represented by the corresponding
payoff matrix, which is given above. Furthermore, there is a unique Nash equilibrium of this
stage-game, and in this equilibrium the firm (the row player) plays L (exerts low effort) and the
consumer (the column player) plays l (buying a low-priced product).
Suppose that there is a small but positive probability p0 > 0 that the firm is an honorable firm
who always exerts high effort. That is, with p0 > 0 probability, Player 1 is a commitment type
who plays H at every period of the repeated game independent of the history. Suppose further
that consumers do not get to observe the effort level of the firm when its their turn, yet, they
observe the outcomes of all previous periods.
Consider now a strategic (non-commitment or normal type) firm who has a discount factor
δ < 1: Can the firm build up a reputation that he is (or acts as if he is) an honorable firm? The
answer to this question is “Yes”–when he is patient enough.
To see this, observe that a rational consumer (Player 2) would play h only if he anticipates
that the firm (Player 1) plays H with a probability of at least 1
2
. Let pt be the posterior belief
that Player 1 is a commitment type after observing some public history ht. Suppose Player
2 of period t + 1 observes (H, l) as the outcome of the preceding period t. This means the
probability that Player 2 of period t anticipated for H was less than (or equal) to 1
2
. This
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9probability is pt + σ
1(ωn, ht)(H) where σ
1(ωn, ht)(H) is the probability that the strategic (or
normal) type Player 1 assigns to playing H at period t after observing ht. Therefore, we have
pt + σ
1(ωn, ht)(H) ≤
1
2
. But, this implies that the posterior belief of Player 2 of period t + 1
that Player 1 is a commitment type –after observing (H, l)– will be pt+1 =
pt
pt+σ1(ωn,ht)(H)
≥ 2pt.
This means every time the strategic player plays H , he doubles his reputation, i.e., the belief
that he is a commitment type doubles. Therefore, mimicking the commitment type finitely many
rounds, the firm can increase the belief that he is an honorable firm (a commitment type) with
more than probability 1
2
. In such a case, the short lived consumers (Player 2s) will start best
replying by buying high-priced products. If the firm is patient enough – when δ is high– payoffs
from those finitely many periods will be negligible. Furthermore, as δ → 1, one can show that
the strategic Player 1 can guarantee himself a discounted average payoff arbitrarily close to 2
–which is his payoff under his (pure) Stackelberg action.
B. Motivating Example II: A Consultant with Reputational Concerns under Moral Hazard
Our second example is a more involved example with finer details regarding the nested
information structure: A consultant is to advise different firms in different projects. In each
of these projects, a supervisor from the particular firm is to inspect the consultant regarding his
effort during the particular project. The consultant can either exert a (H)igh level of effort or a
(L)ow level of effort while working on the project.
The effort of the consultant is not directly observable to the supervisor. Yet, after the consultant
chooses his effort level, the supervisor gets to observe a public signal z2 ∈ {h, l} which
is correlated with the effort level of the consultant according to the probability distribution
ρ2(h|H) = ρ2(l|L) = p > 1
2
.
Observing this public signal, the supervisor recommends to the upper administration to give
the consultant a (B)onus or (N)ot. The consultant does not observe the supervisor’s recom-
mendation but a private signal z1 ∈ {b, n} which is correlated both with his effort level and the
supervisor’s recommendation according to the following probability distribution: ρ1(b|(H,B)) =
ρ1(n|(L,N)) = q > ρ1(b|(H,N)) = ρ1(n|(L,B)) = r > 1
2
. That is, exerting (H)igh level
of effort increases the chance of getting the bonus –for a fixed action of the supervisor, i.e.,
ρ1(b|(H, ·)) > ρ1(b|(L, ·). Similarly, the probability of getting the bonus is higher when the
supervisor recommends the (B)onus –for a fixed action of the consultant, i.e., ρ1(b|(·, B)) >
ρ1(b|(·, N).
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The supervisor prefers to recommend a (B)onus when the consultant works hard (exerts (H)igh
effort) and (N)ot to recommend a bonus when the consultant shirks (exerts (L)ow effort). For the
consultant exerting a high level of effort is costly. Therefore, the stage game and the preferences
regarding the stage game can be illustrated as follows:5
P1
H
L
z2 ∈ {h, l} P2
N
B
z1 ∈ {b, n}
Figure 2: The illustration of the stage game
B N
H 1, 1 −1,−1
L 2,−2 0, 0
It is commonly known that there is a positive probability p0 > 0 with which the consultant is an
honorable consultant who always exerts (H)igh level of effort. That is, with p0 > 0 probability the
consultant is a commitment type who plays H at every period of the repeated game independent
of the history.
Consider the incentives of a strategic (non-commitment or normal type) consultant: Does such
a consultant have an incentive to build a reputation by exerting a high level effort, if the game
is repeated only finitely many times? What kind of equilibrium behavior would one expect
from such a consultant if the game is repeated infinitely many times with discounting for a fixed
discount factor? For example, if he is building a reputation, how often does he shirk (exert (L)ow
level of effort)? Does there exist reputation cycles, i.e., does the consultant build a reputation by
exerting high effort for a while and then milks it by exerting low effort until his reputation level
falls under a particular threshold? What happens when the consultant becomes arbitrarily patient,
i.e., his discount factor tends to 1? What can we say about the consultant’s optimal reputation
5Note that the stage game is a sequential-move game, the payoffs are summarized in a payoff matrix just for illustrative
purposes.
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building strategy when he does not discount the future but rather cares about his undiscounted
average payoff?
The aim of this paper is to provide tractable techniques to answer similar questions in settings
where agents have reputational concerns in repeated game setups described in our model.
III. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES AND EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR
Our first set of results will be regarding the optimal strategies of the strategic long-lived Player
1.
Briefly, since each Player 2 plays the stage game only once, we show that when the information
of Player 2 is nested in that of Player 1, under a plausible assumption, the strategic long-lived
Player 1 can, without any loss in payoff performance, formulate his strategy as a controlled
Markovian system optimization, and thus through dynamic programming. The discounted nature
of the optimization problem then leads to the existence of a stationary solution. This implies that
for any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, there exists a payoff-equivalent stationary Markov Perfect
Equilibrium. Hence, we conclude that the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium payoff set and Markov
Perfect Equilibrium payoff set of the strategic long-lived Player 1 coincide with each other.
Below, we provide three results on optimal strategies following steps parallel to [46] which
builds on Witsenhausen [43], Walrand and Varaiya [42], Teneketzis [41], and [45]. These struc-
tural results on optimal strategies will be the key for the following Markov chain construction
as well as Theorem III.1 and Theorem III.2.
A. Optimal Strategies: Finite Horizon
We first consider the finitely repeated game setup where the stage game is to be repeated
T ∈ N times. In such a case, the strategic long-lived Player 1 is to maximize π1(σ) given by
π1(σ) = EPωn,σ(1− δ)
∑T−1
t=0 δ
tu1(at).
Our first result, Lemma III.1, shows that, given any fixed sequence of strategies of the short-
lived Player 2s, any optimal strategy of the strategic long-lived Player 1 can be replaced, without
any loss in payoff performance, by another optimal strategy which only depends on the (public)
information of Player 2s. More specifically, we show that for any private strategy of the long-
lived Player 1 against an arbitrary sequence of strategies of Player 2s, there exists a public
strategy of the long-lived Player 1 against the very same sequence of strategies of Player 2s
which gives the strategic long-lived player a weakly better payoff.
November 15, 2017 DRAFT
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To the best of our knowledge, this is a new result in the repeated games literature. What is
different here from similar results in the repeated games literature is that this is true even when
Player 2s strategies are non-Bayesian.6
Before we state Lemma III.1, we note here that the signal z2t that will be available to short-
lived Player 2s after round t only depends on the action of the long-lived Player 1 at round t
and that the following holds for all t ≥ 1.
Pσ(z
2
t |a
1
t ; a
1
s, a
2
s, s ≤ t− 1) = Pσ(z
2
t |a
1
t ). (3)
Observation (3) plays an important role in the proof of our first result:
Lemma III.1. In the finitely repeated setup, given any sequence of strategies of short-lived
Player 2s, for any (private) strategy of the strategic long-lived Player 1, there exists a (public)
strategy that only conditions on {z20 , z
2
1 , · · · , z
2
t−1} which yields the strategic long-lived Player
1 a weakly better payoff against the given sequence of strategies of Player 2s.
Proof. See the Appendix.
A brief word of caution is in order. The structural results of the type Lemma III.1, while
extremely useful in team theory and zero-delay source coding [46], do not always apply to
generic games unless one further restricts the setup. In particular, a generic (Nash) equilibrium
may be lost once one alters the strategy structure of one of the players. However, we consider the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept here which is of a leader-follower type (i.e., Stackelberg
in the policy space): Player 2s respond in a Bayesian fashion to Player 1 who in turn is aware of
Player 2s commitment to this policy. This subtle difference is crucial also in signalling games;
the features that distinguish Nash equilibria from Stackelberg equilibria in signaling games are
discussed in detail in [39, Section 2].
Lemma III.1 implies that any private information of Player 1 is statistically irrelevant for
optimal strategies: for any private strategy of the long-lived Player 1, there exists a public strategy
which performs at least as good as the original one against a given sequence of strategies of
Player 2s. That is, in the finitely repeated setup, the long-lived Player 1 can depend his strategy
only on the public information and his type without any loss in payoff performance. We would
6A relevant result appears in [20], which shows that sequential equilibrium payoffs and perfect public equilibrium payoffs
coincide (See the Appendix B of [20]) in a similar infinitely repeated game setup.
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like to note here once again that Lemma III.1 above holds for any sequence of strategies of
Player 2s, even non-Bayesian ones.
On the other hand, when Player 2s are Bayesian rational, as is the norm in repeated games,
we obtain a more refined structural result which we state below as Lemma III.2. As mentioned
before, in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the short-lived Player 2 at time t, playing the stage
game only once, seeks to maximize
∑
a1 Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t])u
2(a1, a2). However, it may be that his best
response set, i.e. the maximizing action set argmax(
∑
a1 Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t])u
2(a1, a2)), may not be
unique.
To avoid such set-valued correspondence dynamics, we consider the following assumption,
which requires that the best response of each Player 2 is essentially unique: Note that any strategy
for Player 2 of time t who chooses argmax
(∑
a1 Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t])u
2(a1, a2)
)
in a measurable fashion
does not have to be continuous in the conditional probability κ(·) = Pσ(a
1
t = ·|z
2
[0,t]), since such
a strategy partitions (or quantizes) the set of probability measures on A1. The set of κ which
borders these partitions is a subset of the set of probability measures Be = ∪k,m∈A2B
k,m, where
for any pair k,m ∈ A2, the belief set Bk,m is defined as
Bk,m =
{
κ ∈ ∆(A1) :
∑
a1∈A1
κ(a1)u2(a1, k) =
∑
a1∈A1
κ(a1)u2(a1, m)
}
. (4)
These are the sets of probability measures where Player 2 is indifferent between multiple actions.
Assumption III.1. Either of the following holds:
(i) Pσ
(
Pσ(a
1
t = ·|z
2
[0,t]) ∈ Be
)
= 0 for all t ≥ 0. In particular, Player 2s have a unique best
response so that the set of discontinuity, Be, is never visited (with probability 1).
(ii) Whenever Player 2s are indifferent between multiple actions they choose the action that is
better for Player 1.
The following remarks are in order regarding Assumption III.1.
Remark III.1.
(i) In the classical reputations literature, a standard result is that under mild conditions Bayesian
rational short-lived players can be surprised at most finitely many times, e.g., [19, Theorem
4.1], [40, Lemma 2.4], implying that the jumps in the corresponding belief dynamics of
Player 2s will be bounded away from zero in a transient phase until the optimal responses
of Player 2s converge to a fixed action. In such cases, the payoff structure can be designed
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so that the set of discontinuity, Be, is visited with 0 probability, and hence Assumption
III.1(i) holds.
(ii) Assumption III.1(ii) is a standard assumption in the contract theory literature. In a principal-
agent model, whenever an agent is indifferent between two actions he chooses the action
that is better for the principal, e.g., when an incentive compatibility condition binds so that
the agent is indifferent between exerting a high level of effort and exerting a low level
effort, then the agent chooses to exert the high level of effort (see [5] for further details).
Assumption III.1(ii) trivially holds also when the stage game payoff functions are identical
for both players (as in team setups) or are aligned (as in a potential game).
Lemma III.2. In the finitely repeated setup, under Assumption III.1, given any arbitrary sequence
of strategies of Bayesian rational short-lived Player 2s, for any (private) strategy of the strategic
long-lived Player 1, there exists a (public) strategy that only conditions on Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1]) ∈ ∆(Ω)
and t which yields the strategic long-lived Player 1 a weakly better payoff against the given
sequence of strategies of Player 2s.
Proof. See the Appendix.
B. Controlled Markov Chain Construction
The proof of Lemma III.2 reveals the construction of a controlled Markov chain. Building on
this proof, we will explicitly construct the dynamic programming problem as a controlled Markov
chain optimization problem (that is, a Markov Decision Process). Under Assumption III.1, given
any sequence of strategies of Bayesian rational Player 2s, the solution to this optimization
problem characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the strategic long-lived player in an associated
Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
The state space, the action set, the transition kernel, and the per-stage reward function of the
controlled Markov chain metioned above are given as follows:
• The state space is ∆(Ω); µt ∈ ∆(Ω) is often called the belief-state. We endow this space
with the weak convergence topology, and we note that since Ω is finite, the set of probability
measures on Ω is a compact space.
• The action set is the set of all maps Γ1 := {γ1 : Ω → A1}. We note that since the
commitment type policies are given a priori, one could also regard the action set to be the
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set A1 itself.7
• The transition kernel is given by P : ∆(Ω)×Γ1 → B(∆(Ω))8 so that for all B ∈ B(∆(Ω)):
P
(
Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1]) ∈ B
∣∣∣∣Pσ(ω|z2[0,s−1]), γ1s , s ≤ t− 1
)
= P
({ ∑
a1t−1
Pσ(z
2
t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])∑
a1t−1,ω
Pσ(z
2
t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])
}
∈ B
∣∣∣∣Pσ(ω|z2[0,s−1]), γ1s , s ≤ t− 1
)
= P
({ ∑
a1t−1
Pσ(z
2
t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])∑
a1t−1,ω
Pσ(z2t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])
}
∈ B
∣∣∣∣Pσ(ω|z2[0,t−2]), γ1t−1
)
(5)
In the above derivation, we use the fact that the term Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2]) is uniquely identified
by Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2]) and γ
1
t−1. Here, γ
1
t−1 is the control action.
• The per-stage reward function, given γ2t , is U(µt, γ
1) : ∆(Ω)×Γ1 → R which is defined
as follows
U(µt, γ
1) :=
∑
ω
Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1])
∑
A1
(
1{a1t=γ1(ω)}u
1(a1t , γ
2
t (Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t−1]), z
2
t ))
)
(6)
where µt = Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1]). Here, γ
2
t is a given measurable function of the posterior Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t]).
We note again that for each Bayesian rational short-lived Player 2 we have
γ2t (Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t−1]), z
2
t )) ∈ argmax
(∑
a1
Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t])u
2(a1, a2)
)
.
Lemma III.2 implies that in the finitely repeated setup, under Assumption III.1, when Player
2s are Bayesian rational, the long-lived strategic Player 1 can depend his strategy only on Player
2s’ posterior belief and time without any loss in payoff performance.
Consider now any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where the strategic long-lived Player 1 plays
a private strategy, since the strategic long-lived Player 1 cannot have a profitable deviation, the
public strategy identified in Lemma III.2 must also give him the same payoff against the given
sequence of strategies of Player 2s. Hence, in the finitely repeated setup, under Assumption III.1,
7We note that randomized strategies may also be considered by adding a randomization variable.
8
B(∆(Ω)) is the set of all Borel sets on ∆(Ω).
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any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium payoff of the normal type Player 1, is also a Perfect Public
Equilibrium payoff.9 Therefore, given our Markov chain construction:
Theorem III.1. In the finitely repeated game, under Assumption III.1, the set of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium payoffs of the strategic long-lived Player 1 is equal to the set of Markov Perfect
Equilibrium payoffs.
Proof. Markov Perfect Equilibrium payoff set is a subset of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
payoff set. Hence, it is enough to show that for each Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium there exists a
properly defined Markov Perfect Equilibrium which is payoff equivalent for the strategic long-
lived Player 1. This follows from Lemma III.2 and our Markov chain construction.
Lemma III.1 and Lemma III.2 above have a coding theoretic flavor: The classic works by
Witsenhausen [43] and Walrand and Varaiya [42], are of particular relevance; Teneketzis [41]
extended these approaches to the more general setting of non-feedback communication and
[45] and [46] extended these results to more general state spaces (including Rd). Extensions
to infinite horizon stages have been studied in [31]. In particular, Lemma III.1 can be viewed
as a generalization of Witsenhausen [43]. On the other hand, Lemma III.2 can be viewed as a
generalization of Walrand and Varaiya [42] and [31]. The proofs build on [45]. However, these
results are different from the above contributions due to the fact that the utility functions do not
depend explicitly on the type of Player 1, but depend explicitly on the actions a1t and that these
actions are not available to Player 2 unlike the setup in [45]. Next, we consider the infinitely
repeated setup in the following.
C. Infinite Horizon and Equilibrium Strategies
We proceed with Lemma III.3 which is the extension of Lemma III.2 to the infinitely repeated
setup. Lemma III.3 will be the key result that gives us a similar controlled Markov chain
construction for the infinitely repeated game, hence a payoff-equivalent stationary Markov Perfect
Equilibrium for each Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Lemma III.3. In the infinitely repeated game, under Assumption III.1, given any arbitrary
sequence of strategies of Bayesian rational short-lived Player 2s, for any (private) strategy
9A Perfect Public Equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where each player uses a public strategy, i.e., a strategy that
only depends on the information which is available to both players.
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of the strategic long-lived Player 1, there exists a (public) strategy that only conditions on
Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1]) ∈ ∆(Ω) and t which yields the strategic long-lived Player 1 a weakly better
payoff against the given sequence of strategies of Player 2s.
Furthermore, the strategic long-lived Player 1’s optimal stationary strategy against this given
sequence of strategies of Player 2s can be characterized by solving an infinite horizon discounted
dynamic programming problem.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, in the infinitely repeated setup as well, under Assumption III.1, any private strategy
of the normal type Player 1 can be replaced, without any loss in payoff performance, with a
public strategy which only depends on Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1]) and t. Hence, for any Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium there exists a Perfect Public Equilibrium which is payoff-equivalent for the
strategic long-lived Player 1 in the infinitely repeated game as well.
Furthermore, since there is a stationary optimal public strategy for the strategic long-lived
Player 1 against any given sequence of strategies of Bayesian rational Player 2s, any payoff the
strategic long-lived Player 1 obtains in a Perfect Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium, he can also
obtain in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium.10
Theorem III.2. In the infinitely repeated game, under Assumption III.1, the set of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium payoffs of the strategic long-lived Player 1 is equal to the set of Markov
Perfect Equilibrium payoffs.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma III.3 and our Markov chain construction as in the
proof of Theorem III.1.
IV. UNDISCOUNTED AVERAGE PAYOFF CASE AND AN UPPER PAYOFF BOUND FOR THE
ARBITRARILY PATIENT LONG-LIVED PLAYER
We next analyze the setup where the strategic long-lived Player 1 were to maximize his
undiscounted average payoff instead of his discounted average payoff. Not only we identify an
optimal strategy for the strategic long-lived Player 1 in this setup, but also we establish an upper
10A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium where there is a payoff-relevant state space and both players
are playing Markov strategies that only depend on the state variable.
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payoff bound for the arbitrarily patient strategic long-lived Player 1 in the standard discounted
average payoff case – through an Abelian inequality.11
The only difference from our original setup is that the strategic long-lived Player 1 now
wishes to maximize lim infN→∞
1
N
E
µ0
σ1,σ2 [
∑N−1
t=0 u
1(a1t , a
2
t )]. Therefore, in any Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, same as before, the short-lived (Bayesian rational) Player 2s will continue to be
best replying to their updated beliefs. On the other hand, the strategic long-lived Player 1 will
be playing a strategy which maximizes his undiscounted average payoff given that each Player
2 will be best replying to their updated beliefs.
The main problem in analyzing the undiscounted setup is that most of the structural cod-
ing/signaling results that we have for finite horizon or infinite horizon discounted optimal control
problems do not generalize for the undiscounted case, see [31]. Therefore, we will arrive at the
following results using an indirect approach which is based on more intricate arguments.
Observe that {µt(ω¯) = E[1ω=ω¯|z
2
[0,t]]}, for every fixed ω¯, is a bounded martingale sequence
adapted to the information at Player 2, and as a result as t → ∞, by the submartingale
convergence theorem [6] there exists µ¯ such that µt → µ¯ almost surely.
Let us re-visit the standard discounted setup: Let µ¯ be an invariant posterior, that is, a limit
of the µt process which exists by the discussion with regard to the submartingale convergence
theorem. Equation (13) leads to the following fixed point equation:12
V 1(ω, µ) = max
a1=γ1t (µ,ω)
(E[u1(a1t , γ
2(µ)) + δE[V 1[(ω, µ)])
Therefore, V 1(ω, µ) = 1
1−δ
maxγ1t E[u
1(a1t , a
2
t (µ))], and since the solution is asymptotically
stationary, the optimal strategy of the strategic long-lived Player 1 when µ0 = µ has to be
a Stackelberg solution for a Bayesian game with prior µ; thus, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
strategy for the strategic long-lived Player 1 has to be mimicking the stage game Stackelberg
type forever.
Thus, every optimal strategy should be such that if Player 2’s belief has converged, then
the equilibrium behaviour must be of Stackelberg type. Note also that, by the analysis in the
11Even though there is a large literature on repeated games with incomplete information in the undiscounted setup, the only
papers that we know of that study the reputation games explicitly in the this setup are [10] and [40]. As opposed to our model,
[10] analyzes a two-person reputation game where both of the players are long-lived. On the other hand, [40] unifies results
from merging of probabilities, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information in both discounted and undiscounted
setups.
12Equation (13) appears in the proof of Lemma III.3 in the Appendix.
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previous section, Player 2 behaves as if his strategy is optimal once his opinion is within a
neighbourhood of the limit belief. Once Player 2s start best replying to the limit belief, Player
1’s optimal strategy becomes the Stackelberg action which is maximized according to the limit
belief of Player 2s.
We state the following identifiability assumption.
Assumption IV.1. Uniformly over all stationary optimal (for some discount parameter) strategies
σ˜1, σ˜2,
lim
δ→1
sup
σ˜1,σ˜2
∣∣∣∣Eσ˜1,σ˜2(1− δ)
[ ∞∑
t=0
δtu1(a1t , a
2
t )
]
− lim sup
N→∞
1
N
Eσ˜1,σ˜2
[ N−1∑
t=0
u1(a1t , a
2
t )
]∣∣∣∣ = 0 (7)
Assumption IV.1 may seem to be a strict assumption at first look. We note that a sufficient
condition for Assumption IV.1 is the following.
Assumption IV.2. Whenever the strategic long-lived Player 1 adopts a stationary strategy, for
any initial commitment prior, there exists a stopping time τ such that for t ≥ τ , Player 2s’
posterior beliefs become so that his best response does not change (that is, his best-response to
his beliefs leads to a constant action). Furthermore, E[τ ] < ∞, uniformly over any stationary
strategy σ1.
Furthermore, Proposition IV.1 below shows that Assumption IV.1 is indeed implied by one of
the most standard identifiability assumptions in the repeated games literature:
Proposition IV.1. Consider the matrix A whose rows consist of the vectors:[
Pσ(z
2
t = k|a
1
t = 1) Pσ(z
2
t = k|a
1
t = 2) · · · Pσ(z
2
t = k|a
1
t = |A
1|)
]
where k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |Z2|} If rank(A) = |A1|, then Assumption IV.1 holds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The sufficient condition described in Proposition IV.1 is a standard identifiability assumption,
sometimes referred as the full-rank monitoring assumption in the reputations literature, see for
example [9, Assumption 2]. Under Assumption IV.1, we establish that mimicking a Stackelberg
commitment type forever is an optimal strategy for the strategic long-lived Player 1 in the
undiscounted setup:
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Theorem IV.1. In the undiscounted setup, under Assumption IV.1, an optimal strategy for the
strategic long-lived Player 1 in the infinitely repeated game is the stationary strategy “mimicking
the Stackelberg commitment type forever.”
Proof. See the Appendix.
As an implication of Theorem IV.1, we next state the aforementioned upper bound for Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium payoffs of the arbitrarily patient strategic long-lived Player 1 in the
discounted setup as Theorem IV.2.
Theorem IV.2. Under Assumption IV.1, lim supδ→1 V
1
δ (ω, µ
0)≤ maxα1∈∆(A1),α2∈BR(α1) u1(α1, α2).
That is, an upperbound for the value of the reputation for an arbitrarily patient strategic long-
lived Player 1 in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the discounted setup is his stage game
Stackelberg equilibrium payoff.
Proof of Theorem IV.2. Note the following Abelian theorem: Let an be a sequence of non-
negative numbers and β ∈ (0, 1). Then,
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
am ≤ lim inf
β↑1
(1− β)
∞∑
m=0
βmam
≤ lim sup
β↑1
(1− β)
∞∑
m=0
βmam ≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
am (8)
Therefore, for any δ, an upper bound is obtained by the corresponding undiscounted average
payoff problem. Since for every δ, an optimal strategy is stationary, and under the stationary
strategy the average payoff converges to the one achieved by the case where the type of Player
1 is correctly identified by Player 2s, the result follows from Theorem IV.1.
Theorem IV.2 provides an upper bound on the value of reputation for the strategic long-lived
Player 1 in the discounted setup. That is, in the discounted setup, an arbitrarily patient strategic
long-lived Player 1 cannot do any better than his best Stackelberg payoff under reputational
concerns as well. This upperbound coincides with those provided before by Fudenberg and
Levine [19] and Gossner [23].
V. A LOWER PAYOFF BOUND ON REPUTATION THROUGH MEASURE CONCENTRATION
We next identify a lower payoff bound for the value of reputation through an explicit measure
concentration analysis. As mentioned before, it was Fudenberg and Levine [18], [19] who
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provided such a lower payoff bound for the first time. They constructed a lower bound for any
equilibrium payoff of the strategic long-lived player by showing that Bayesian rational short-
lived players can be surprised at most finitely many times when a strategic long-lived Player
mimics a commitment type forever.
Gossner [23], on the other hand, used information theoretic ideas to obtain a more concise
lower payoff bound: Using the chain rule property of the concept of relative entropy, [23] obtained
a lower bound for any equilibrium payoff of the strategic long-lived player by showing that any
equilibrium payoff of the strategic long-lived player is bounded from below (and above) by a
function of the average discounted divergence between the prediction of the short-lived players
conditional on the long-lived player’s type and its marginal.
Our analysis below provides a sharper lower payoff bound for the value of reputation through
a refined measure concentration analysis. To obtain this lower bound, as in [19] as well as
[23], we let the strategic long-lived Player 1 mimic (forever) a commitment type, ωˆ = m, to
investigate the best responses of the short-lived Player 2s. In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
such a deviation, i.e. deviating to mimicking a particular commitment type forever, is always
possible for the strategic long-lived Player 1.
Let |Ω| = M be the number of all possible types of the long-lived Player 1. With m being
the type mimicked forever by Player 1, we will identify a function f below such that for any
ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ when criterion (9) below holds,
Pσ(ω = m|z
2
[0,t])
Pσ(ω = ωˆ|z2[0,t])
≥ f(M), (9)
Player 2 of time t will act as if he knew the type of the long-lived Player 1 is m. This will
follow from the fact that maxa2
∑
Pσ(ωˆ|z
2
[0,t])u
2(a1, a2) is continuous in Pσ(ωˆ|z
2
[0,t]) and that
Pσ(ωˆ|z
2
[0,t]) concentrates around the true type under a mild informativeness condition on the
observable variables.
Let
τm = min{T ≥ 0 : max
a2
∑
a1
Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t])u
2(a1, a2) = max
a2
∑
a1
Pσ(a
1|ω = m)u2(a1, a2) ∀t ≥ T},
Intuitively, τm is the time when Player 2s start to behave as if the type of the long-lived Player
1 is m as far as their optimal strategies are concerned.
The following lemma provides an upper bound for τm regarding the aforementioned criterion
(9).
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Lemma V.1. Let ǫ > 0 be such that for any a¯1 ∈ A1 and a˜2, aˆ2 ∈ A2
|u2(a¯1, a˜2)− u2(a¯1, aˆ2)| ≥
ǫ
1− ǫ
(
max
a1,a2
|u2(a1, a2)|
)
If (9) holds at time t when f(M) = (1−ǫ)
ǫ
M , then τm ≤ t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma V.1 implies that when criterion (9) holds to be true for f(M) = (1−ǫ)
ǫ
M , at time t
any Player 2 of time t and onwards will be best responding to the commitment type m. This
can be interpreted as the long-lived Player having a reputation to behave like type m when
criterion (9) is satisfied.
We next provide Theorem V.1, which shows that as a stopping time τm is dominated by a
geometric random variable.
Theorem V.1. Suppose that 0 < Pσ(z
2|ω=m)
Pσ(z2|ω=ωˆ)
< ∞ for all ωˆ ∈ Ωˆ and z2 ∈ Z2. For all k ∈ N,
Pσ(τm ≥ k) ≤ Rρ
k for some ρ ∈ (0, 1) and R ∈ R.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We are now ready to provide our lower bound for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium payoffs of
the strategic long-lived Player 1, for a fixed discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem V.2. A lower bound for the expected payoff of the strategic long-lived Player 1 in any
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (in the discounted setup) is given by maxm∈Ωˆ L(m) where
L(m) = E{ω=m}
[ τm∑
k=1
δku1(a1t , a
2
t )
]
+ E{ω=m}
[ ∞∑
k=τm+1
δku1s
∗
(m)
]
where u1s
∗
(m) := mina2∈BR2(m) u
1(m, a2) and BR2(m) := argmaxa2∈A2 u
2(m, a2).
Proof. It follows from Theorem V.1 that the stopping time τm is dominated by a geometric
random variable. Therefore the discounted average payoff can be lower bounded by the sum of
the following two terms:
E{ω=m}
[ τm∑
k=1
δku1(a1t , a
2
t )
]
+ E{ω=m}
[ ∞∑
k=τm+1
δku1s(m)
∗
]
where u1s
∗
(m) := mina2∈BR2(m) u
1(m, a2) and BR2(m) := argmaxa2∈A2 u
2(m, a2). Since a
deviation to mimicking any of the commitment types forever is available to the strategic long-
lived Player 1 in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, taking the maximum of the lower bound
above for all commitment types gives the desired result.
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Observe that when m is a Stackelberg type, i.e., a commitment type who is committed to play
the stage game Stackelberg action argmaxα1∈∆(A1) u1(α1, BR
2(α1)) for which Player 2s have
a unique best reply then
u1s
∗
(m) = max
α1∈∆(A1),α2∈BR(α1)
u1(α1, α2)
becomes the stage game Stackelberg payoff.
We next turn to the case of the arbitrarily patient strategic long-lived Player 1. That is, what
happens when δ → 1.
Theorem V.3.
lim
δ→1
L(m) ≥ u1s
∗
(m)
Proof of Theorem V.3. The proof follows from Theorem V.2 by taking the limit δ → 1.
Since until time τm, we can bound the payoff to strategic long-lived Player 1 below by the
worst possible payoff, and after τm the strategic long-lived Player 1 guarantees the associated
Stackelberg payoff, we obtain
lim
δ→1
L(m) ≥ lim
δ→1
E[1 − δτm ] min
a1,a2
u1(a1, a2) + lim
δ→1
E[δτmu1s
∗
(m)] = u1s
∗
(m).
That limδ→1 E[δ
τm − 1] = 0 and limδ→1 E[δ
τ ] = 1 follow from the dominated convergence
theorem and the fact that τm is finite with probability 1.
Theorem V.3 implies that the lower payoff bound that we provided in Theorem V.2 coincides
in the limit as δ → 1 with those of Fudenberg and Levine [19] and Gossner [23]. That is, if
there exists a Stackelberg commitment type, an arbitrarily patient strategic long-lived Player 1
can guarantee himself a payoff arbitrarily close to the associated Stackelberg payoff in every
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the discounted setup.
VI. CONTINUITY OF PAYOFF VALUES
Next, we consider the continuity of the payoff values of the strategic long-lived Player 1
in the prior beliefs of Player 2s for any Markov Perfect Equilibrium obtained through the
aforementioned dynamic programming. In this section, we assume the following.
Assumption VI.1. Either Assumption III.1(i) holds or the stage game payoff functions are
identical for both players.
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We note that, as in [31] if the game is an identical interest game, the continuity results would
follow.
Lemma VI.1. Under Assumption VI.1, the transition kernel of the aforementioned Markov chain
is weakly continuous in the (belief) state and action.
Proof. See the Appendix.
By Assumption VI.1, the per-stage reward function, U(µt, γ
1), is continuous in µt. The
continuity of the transition kernel and per-stage reward function together with the compactness
of the action space leads to the following continuity result.
Theorem VI.1. Under Assumption VI.1, the value function V 1t of the dynamic program given
in (13) is continuous in µt for all t ≥ 0.
13
Proof of Theorem VI.1. Given Lemma VI.1 and Assumption III.1(i), the proof follows from
an inductive argument and the measurable selection hypothesis. In this case, the discounted opti-
mality operator becomes a contraction mapping from the Banach space of continuous functions
on ∆(Ω) to itself, leading to a fixed point in this space.
Theorem VI.1 implies that, any Markov Perfect Equilibrium payoff of the strategic long-
lived Player 1 obtained through the dynamic program in (13) is robust to small perturbations
in the prior beliefs of Player 2s under Assumption III.1. This further implies that the following
conjecture made by Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson [9] is indeed true in our setup: There
exists a particular equilibrium in the complete information game and a bound such that for any
commitment type prior (of Player 2s) less than this bound, there exists an equilibrium of the
incomplete information game where the strategic long-lived Player 1’s payoff is arbitrarily close
to his payoff from the particular equilibrium in the complete information game.14 This is also
in line with the findings of [11], which uses the methods of [1] to show a similar upper semi
continuity result.
13The dynamic program (13) appears in the proof of Lemma III.3 in the Appendix.
14This conjecture appears as a presumption of [9, Theorem 3]. They write “We conjecture this hypothesis is redundant, given
the other conditions of the theorem, but have not been able to prove it”.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the reputations problem of an informed long-lived player who controls
his reputation against a sequence of uninformed short-lived players by employing tools from
stochastic control theory. The main assumption in our model was that the information of the
short-lived players is nested in that of the long-lived player. Our findings contribute to the
reputations literature by obtaining new results on the structure of equilibrium behavior in finite-
horizon, infinite-horizon, and undiscounted settings, as well as continuity results in the prior
probabilities, and improved upper and lower bounds on the value of reputations. In particular,
we exhibited that a control theoretic formulation can be utilized to characterize the equilibrium
behavior. It is our hope that the machinery we provide in this paper will open a new avenue for
applied work studying reputations in different frameworks.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma III.1.
At time t = T , the payoff function can be written as follows, where γ2t denotes a given fixed
strategy for Player 2:
E[u1(a1t , γ
2
t (z
2
[0,t]))|z
2
[0,t−1]] = E[F (a
1
t , z
2
[0,t−1], z
2
t )|z
2
[0,t−1]]
where, F (a1t , z
2
[0,t−1], z
2
t ) = u
1(a1t , γ
2
t (z
2
[0,t])).
Now, by a stochastic realization argument (see Borkar [7]), we can write z2t = R(a
1
t , vt) for
some independent noise process vt. As a result, the expected payoff conditioned on z
2
[0,t−1] is
equal to, by the smoothing property of conditional expectation, the following:
E
[
E[G(a1t , z
2
[0,t−1], vt)|ω, a
1
t , z
2
[0,t−1]]
∣∣∣∣z2[0,t−1]
]
,
for some G. Since vt is independent of all the other variables at times s ≤ t, it follows that
there exists H so that E[G(a1t , z
2
[0,t−1], vt)|ω, a
1
t , z
2
[0,t−1]] =: H(ω, a
1
t , z
2
[0,t−1]). Note that when ω
is a commitment type, a1t is fixed quantity or a fixed random variable.
Now, we will apply Witsenhausen’s two stage lemma [43], to show that we can obtain a lower
bound for the double expectation by picking a1t as a result of a measurable function of ω, z
2
[0,t−1].
Thus, we will find a strategy which only uses (ω, z2[0,t−1]) which performs as well as one which
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uses the entire memory available at Player 1. To make this precise, let us fix γ2t and define for
every k ∈ A1:
βk :=
{
ω, z2[0,t−1] : G(ω, z
2
[0,t−1], k) ≤ G(ω, z
2
[0,t−1], q), ∀q 6= k
}
.
Such a construction covers the domain set consisting of (xt, q[0,t−1]) but possibly with overlaps.
It covers the elements in Ω ×
∏T−1
t=0 Z
2, since for every element in this product set, there is a
maximizing k ∈ A1. To avoid the overlap, define a function γ∗,1t as:
qt = γ
∗,1
t (ω, z
2
[0,t−1]) = k, if(ω, z
2
[0,t−1]) ∈ βk \ ∪
k−1
i=1 βi,
with β0 = ∅. The new strategy performs at least as well as the original strategy even though it
has a restricted structure.
The same discussion applies for earlier time stages as we discuss below. We iteratively proceed
to study the other time stages. For a three-stage problem, the payoff at time t = 2 can be written
as:
E
[
u1(a12, γ
2
2(z
2
1 , z
2
2)) + E[u
1(γ∗,13 (ω, z
2
[1,2]), γ
2
3
(
z21 , z
2
2 , R(γ
∗,1
3 (ω, z
2
[1,2]), v3)
)
|ω, z21, z
2
2]
∣∣∣∣z21
]
The expression inside the expectation is equal to for some measurable F2, F2(ω, a
1
2, z
2
1 , z
2
2). Now,
once again expressing z22 = R(a
1
2, v2), by a similar argument as above, a strategy at time 2 which
uses ω and z12 and which performs at least as good as the original strategy can be constructed.
By similar arguments, a strategy at time t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T only uses (ω, z2[1,t−1]) can be constructed.
The strategy at time t = 0 uses ω.
B. Proof of Lemma III.2.
The proof follows from a similar argument as that for Lemma III.1, except that the information
at Player 2 is replaced by the sufficient statistic that Player 2 uses: his posterior information. At
time t = T − 1, an optimal Player 2 will use Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t]) as a sufficient statistic for an optimal
decision. Let us fix a strategy for Player 2 at time t, γ2t which only uses the posterior Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t])
as its sufficient statistic. Let us further note that:
Pσ(a
1
t |z
2
[0,t]) =
Pσ(z
2
t , a
1
t |z
2
[0,t−1])∑
a1t
Pσ(z
2
t , a
1
t |z
2
[0,t−1])
=
∑
ω Pσ(z
2
t |a
1
t )Pσ(a
1
t |ω, z
2
[0,t−1])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1])∑
ω
∑
a1t
Pσ(z
2
t |a
1
t )Pσ(a
1
t |ω, z
2
[0,t−1])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1])
(10)
The term Pσ(a
1
t |ω, z
2
[0,t−1]) is determined by the strategy of Player 1 (this follows from Lemma
III.1), γ1t .
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As in [46], this implies that the payoff at the last stage conditioned on z2[0,t−1] is given by
E
[
u1
(
a1t , γ
2
t (Pσ(a
1
t = ·|z
2
[0,t]))
)
|z2[0,t−1]
]
= E
[
F
(
a1t , γ
1
t , Pσ(ω = ·|z
2
[0,t−1])
)
|z2[0,t−1]
]
where, as earlier, we use the fact that z2t is conditionally independent of all the other variables
at times s ≤ t given a1t . Let γ
1,z2
[0,t−1]
t denote the strategy of Player 1. The above state is then
equivalent to, by the smoothing property of conditional expectation, the following:
E
[
E
[
F
(
a1t , γ
1
t , Pσ(ω = ·|z
2
[0,t−1])
)
|ω, γ
1,z2
[0,t−1]
t , Pσ(ω = ·|z
2
[0,t−1]), z
2
[0,t−1]
]∣∣∣∣z2[0,t−1]
]
= E
[
E
[
F
(
a1t , γ
1
t , Pσ(ω = ·|z
2
[0,t−1])
)
|ω, γ1,z
2
[0,t−1], Pσ(ω = ·|z
2
[0,t−1])
]∣∣∣∣z2[0,t−1]
]
(11)
The second line follows since once one picks the strategy γ1,z
2
[0,t−1] , the dependence on z2[0,t−1]
is redundant given
Pσ(ω = ·|z
2
[0,t−1]).
Now, one can construct an equivalence class among the past z2[0,t−1] sequences which induce
the same µt(·) = Pσ(ω ∈ ·|z
2
[0,t−1]), and can replace the strategy in this class with one, which
induces a higher payoff among the finitely many elements in each class for the final time stage.
An optimal output thus may be generated using µt and ω and t, by extending Witsenhausen’s
argument used earlier in the proof of Lemma III.1 for the terminal time stage. Since there
are only finitely many past sequences and finitely many µt, this leads to a (Borel measurable)
selection of ω for every µt, leading to a measurable strategy in µt, ω. Hence, the final stage
payoff can be expressed as Ft(µt) for some Ft, without any performance loss.
The same argument applies for all time stages. To show this, we will apply induction as in
[45]. At time t = T−1, the sufficient statistic both for the immediate payoff, and the continuation
payoff is Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1]), and thus for the payoff impacting the time stage t = T , as a result of
the optimality result for γ1T . To show that the separation result generalizes to all time stages,
it suffices to prove that {(µt, γ
1
t )} has a controlled Markov chain form, if the players use the
structure above.
Now, for t ≥ 1, for all B ∈ B(∆(Ω)):
P
(
Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1]) ∈ B
∣∣∣∣Pσ(ω|z2[0,s−1]), γ1s , s ≤ t− 1
)
= P
({ ∑
a1t−1
Pσ(z
2
t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])∑
a1t−1,ω
Pσ(z2t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])
}
∈ B
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∣∣∣∣Pσ(ω|z2[0,s−1]), γ1s , s ≤ t− 1
)
= P
({ ∑
a1t−1
Pσ(z
2
t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])∑
a1t−1,ω
Pσ(z
2
t−1|a
1
t−1)Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2])Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2])
}
∈ B
∣∣∣∣Pσ(ω|z2[0,s−1]), γ1s , s = t− 1
)
(12)
In the above derivation, we use the fact that the term
Pσ(a
1
t−1|ω, z
2
[0,t−2]) is uniquely identified by Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−2]) and γ
1
t−1.
C. Proof of Lemma III.3.
First, going from a finite horizon to an infinite horizon follows from a change of order of
limit and infimum as we discuss in the following. Observe that for any strategy {γ1t } and any
T ∈ N:
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δtu1(a1t , a
2
t )] ≥ inf
{γ1t }
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δtu1(a1t , a
2
t )]
and thus
lim
T→∞
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δtu1(a1t , a
2
t )] ≥ lim sup
T→∞
inf
{γ1t }
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δtu1(a1t , a
2
t )]
Since the above holds for an arbitrary strategy, it follows then that
inf
{γ1t }
lim
T→∞
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δtu1(a1t , a
2
t )] ≥ lim sup
T→∞
inf
{γ1t }
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δtu1(a1t , a
2
t )]
On the other hand, due to the discounted nature of the problem, the right hand side can
be studied through the dynamic programming (Bellman) iteration algorithms: The following
dynamic program holds: Let µt(w) = Pσ(ω = w|z
2
[0,t−1]).
V 1(ω, µt) = max
γ1t
(
E
[
u1(a1t , a
2
t ) + δE[V
1(ω, µt+1)|µt, γ
1
t
])
=: T(V 1)(ω, µt) (13)
where T is an operator defined by:
T(f)(ω, µt) = max
γ1t
(
E
[
u1(a1t , a
2
t ) + δE[f(ω, µt+1)|µt, γ
1
t
])
A value iteration sequence with V 10 = 0 and Vt+1 = T(Vt) leads to a stationary solution. This
is an infinite horizon discounted payoff optimal dynamic programming equation with a compact
(belief) state space and a finite action spaces (where the strategy is now the action γ1t ). Since
the action set is finite in our formulation, it follows that there is a stationary solution as t→∞.
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Thus, the sequence of maximizations
supγ1 E[
∑T−1
t=0 δ
tu1(a1t , a
2
t )] leads to a stationary solution as T → ∞, and this sequence of
policies admit the structure stated in the statement of the theorem. As a result, we can state
that such strategies are optimal also for the infinite horizon setup, and the dependence on t is
eliminated.
D. Proof of Proposition IV.1.
Following Gossner [23], we know that the conditional relative entropy
E
[
D
(
Pσ(z
2
t ∈ ·|h
2
t , ω)||Pσ(z
2
t ∈ ·|h
2
t )|
)]
→ 0
and Pinsker’s inequality that convergence in total variation is implied by convergence in relative
entropy; it follows that for every z ∈ Z2
E[|Pσ(z
2
t = z|h
2
t )− Pσ(z
2
t = z|h
2
t , ω)|]→ 0 (14)
But,
Pσ(z
2
t = z|h
2
t ) =
∑
a1
Pσ(z
2
t = z|a
1
t = a
1)Pσ(a
1
t = a
1|h2t )
Thus, all we need to ensure is that Player 2’s belief on Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t ) is sufficiently close to a terminal
value. Suppose that the conditions of the theorem holds, but |Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t )− Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t , ω)| > δ for
some subsequence of time values. If the rank of A is |A1|, then, |Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t )− Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t , ω)| >
δ would imply that |Pσ(z
2
t |h
2
t ) − Pσ(z
2
t |h
2
t , ω)| > ǫ for some positive ǫ, which would be a
contradiction (to see this, observe that the vector Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t )−Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t , ω) cannot be orthogonal
to each of the rows of A, due to the rank condition). In particular, (14) implies the convergence
of Pσ(a
1
t |h
2
t ) to a limit. Furthermore, Jensen’s inequality implies that
|E[Pσ(z
2
t = z|h
2
t )− Pσ(z
2
t = z|h
2
t , ω)]| ≤ E[|Pσ(z
2
t = z|h
2
t )− Pσ(z
2
t = z|h
2
t , ω)|]→ 0 (15)
and thus in finite expected time the deviation in the conditional probabilities will be less than a
prescribed amount and Assumption IV.1 holds.
E. Proof of Theorem IV.1
Note the following Abelian inequalities (see, e.g., Lemma 5.3.1 in Hernandez-Lerma and
Lasserre [24]): Let an be a sequence of non-negative numbers and β ∈ (0, 1). Then,
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
am ≤ lim inf
β↑1
(1− β)
∞∑
m=0
βmam ≤ lim sup
β↑1
(1− β)
∞∑
m=0
βmam ≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
m=0
am
(16)
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Thus, for every strategy pair σ1, σ2, and ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ (depending possibly on the
strategies) so that
E
µ0
σ1,σ2(1− δǫ)
[ ∞∑
m=0
βmǫ u
1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
+ ǫ ≥ lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0
σ1,σ2
[N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
Now, let σ1n, σ
2
n be a sequence of strategies which converge to the supremum for the average
payoff. Let σ˜1n, σ˜
2
n be one which comes within ǫ/2 of the supremum so that
sup
σ1,σ2
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
Eσ1,σ2
[N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
Eσ˜1n,σ˜2n
[N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
+ ǫ/2
Let now δǫ close to 1 be a discount factor whose optimal comes within ǫ/2 of the limit when
δ = 1. For this parameter, under σ˜1n, σ˜
2
n one obtains an upper bound on this payoff, which can
be further upper bounded by optimizing over all possible strategies for this δǫ value. This leads
to a stationary strategy. Thus,
sup
σ1,σ2
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
Eσ1,σ2
[ N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
− ǫ/2 ≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
Eσ˜1n,σ˜2n
[ N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)
]]
≤ Eσ˜1n,σ˜2n(1− δǫ)
[ ∞∑
m=0
δmǫ u
1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
+ ǫ/2 ≤ Eσ˜1,σ˜2(1− δǫ)
[ ∞∑
m=0
δmǫ u
1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
+ ǫ/2
≤ lim sup
N→∞
1
N
Eσ˜1,σ˜2
[N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
+ ǫ/2 + ǫ′ (17)
where ǫ′ is a consequence of the following analysis. Under any stationary optimal strategy σ˜1, σ˜2
for a discounted problem,
Eσ˜1,σ˜2(1− δǫ)
[ ∞∑
m=0
δmǫ u
1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
− lim sup
N→∞
1
N
Eσ˜1,σ˜2
[N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)
]
(18)
is uniformly bounded over all stationary policies under Assumption IV.1. Thus, one can select
ǫ′ and then ǫ arbitrarily small so that the result holds in the following fashion: First pick ǫ′ > 0,
find a corresponding δǫ′ with the understanding that for all δǫ ∈ [δǫ′ , 1), (17) holds. Now select
δǫ ≥ δǫ′ to satisfy the second inequality, such a δǫ is guaranteed to exist since there are infinitely
many such δ values up to 1 that satisfies this inequality. Here the uniformity of the convergence
in (18) over all stationary policies is crucial.
In the above analysis, σ˜1, σ˜2 are stationary and with this stationary strategy,
lim
N→∞
1
N
E
µ1,µ2
µ0
[
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)]→
∫
ν∗(dµ, γ)G(µ, γ)
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by the convergence of the expected empirical occupation measures, where ν∗ is the invariant
probability measure which has full support on the Stackelberg strategies.
This leads to the following result which says that the infimum over all strategies is equal to
the infimum over strategies which satisfy the structure given in Lemma III.3, let us call such
strategies ΣM :
inf
σ1
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m) = inf
σ1∈ΣM
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0=µ∗
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m) (19)
Finally, we establish the following:
inf
σ1
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m) = inf
σ1∈ΣM
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m) (20)
This follows from the fact that,
inf
σ1
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m) ≥ inf
σ1∈ΣM
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0=µ∗
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m) (21)
and that by the identifiability condition through using the Stackelberg strategies optimal for
µ0 = µ
∗ to an arbitrary µ0, one obtains that
inf
σ1
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m)− inf
σ1∈ΣM
lim inf
N→∞
1
N
E
µ0=µ∗
σ1,σ2
N−1∑
m=0
u1(a1m, a
2
m) = 0 (22)
On the other hand, once a strategy is given in ΣM , due to the identifiability assumption, any
optimal strategy will need to be infinite repetition of a stage game Stackelberg action.
F. Proof of Lemma V.1.
Suppose that maxx u
2(a1, x) = u2(a1, x∗). Let
Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t]) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Let the maximum of Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t])u
2(a1, x) +
∑
a¯1j 6=a
1 Pσ(a¯
1
j |z
2
[0,t])u
2(a¯1j , x)
be achieved by x∗ so that
Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t])u
2(a1, x′) +
∑
a¯1j 6=a
1
Pσ(a¯
1
j |z
2
[0,t])u
2(a¯1j , x
′)
≤ Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t])u
2(a1, x∗) +
∑
a¯1j 6=a
1
Pσ(a¯
1
j |z
2
[0,t])u
2(a¯1j , x
∗)
for any x′. For this to hold it suffices that
Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t])(u
2(a1, x∗)− u2(a1, x′)) ≥ max
s,t
ǫu2(s, t)
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and since Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t]) ≥ 1− ǫ,
(u2(a1, x∗)− u2(a1, x′)) ≥
maxs,t ǫu
2(s, t)
1− ǫ
.
If Pσ(a
1|z2[0,t]) ≥ 1− ǫ and for all a¯
1
j 6= a
1 we have Pσ(a¯
1
j |z
2
[0,t]) ≤ ǫ/n, (9) holds.
G. Proof of Theorem V.1.
(9) is equivalent to, by Bayes’ rule:
Pσ(z
2
[0,t]|ωˆ = m)
Pσ(z2[0,t]|ωˆ = k)
≥
Pσ(ωˆ = k)f(n)
Pσ(ωˆ = m)
and
n∑
j=0
log
(Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
(Pσ(z2j |ωˆ = k)
≥ log
(
Pσ(ωˆ = k)f(n)
Pσ(ωˆ = m)
)
Note now that (9) implies that τωN ≤ t. Thus, we can now apply a measure concentration result
through McDiarmid’s inequality (see Raginsky and Sason [38]) to deduce that
Pσ(τN ≥ t)
≤ P
( t∑
j=0
log(
Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
Pσ(z2j |ωˆ = k)
) ≤ log(
Pσ(ωˆ = k)f(n)
Pσ(ωˆ = m)
)
)
≤ P
(
1
t + 1
t∑
j=0
log(
Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
Pσ(z2j |ωˆ = k)
)− E[log
(Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
(Pσ(z2j |ωˆ = k)
]
≤
1
t+ 1
log(
Pσ(ωˆ = k)f(n)
Pσ(ωˆ = m)
)− E[log
(Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
(Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = k)
]
)
≤ P
(∣∣∣∣ 1t+ 1
t∑
j=0
log(
Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
Pσ(z2j |ωˆ = k)
)− E[log
(Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
(Pσ(z2j |ωˆ = k)
]
∣∣∣∣
≥ |E[log
(Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ = m)
(Pσ(z2j |ωˆ = k)
]−
1
t+ 1
log(
Pσ(ωˆ = k)f(n)
Pσ(ωˆ = m)
)|
)
≤ 2e
−n
(
E[log
(Pσ(z
2
j |ωˆ=m)
(Pσ(z
2
j
|ωˆ=k)
]− 1
t+1
log(
Pσ(ωˆ=k)f(n)
Pσ(ωˆ=m)
)
)2
/(b−a)
(23)
where a ≤ Zj ≤ b with Zj =
Pσ(z2j |ωˆ=m)
Pσ(z2j |ωˆ=k)
. This implies, since log(n)/n → 0 and f(n) =
n(1 − ǫ)/ǫ and by Lemma V.1, that the probability of τN ≥ t is upper bounded asymptotically
by a geometric random variable, that is, there exists R <∞ and ρ ∈ (0, 1) so that for all k ∈ N,
Pσ(τm ≥ t) ≤ Rρ
t.
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H. Proof of Lemma VI.1.
From (12), we observe the following. Let f be a continuous function on ∆(Ω). Then
E[f(µt+1)|µt, γ
1
t ] is continuous in (µt, γ
1
t ) if
∑
z2t
f(H(µt, z
2
t , γ
1
t ))Pσ(z
2
t |γ
1
t ) is continuous in
µt, γ
1
t where µt+1 = H(µt, z
2
t , γ
1
t ) defined by (12) with the variables
1{γ1t (ω,z2[0,t−1])=a1t } = Pσ(a
1
t |ω, z
2
[0,t−1]), µt(ω) = Pσ(ω|z
2
[0,t−1])
Instead of considering continuous functions on ∆(Ω), we can also consider continuity of µt+1(ω)
for every ω since pointwise convergence implies convergence in total variation and which in turn
implies convergence under weak convergence by Scheffe´’s Theorem. Now, for every fixed z2t = z,
µt+1(ω) is continuous in µt for every ω, and hence H(µt, z
2
t , γ
1
t ) is continuous in total variation
since pointwise convergence implies convergence in total variation. Furthermore, Pσ(z
2
t |γ
1
t , µt)
is continuous in µt for a given γ
1
t ; thus, weak continuity follows.
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